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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

12 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR
Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, G-2
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN
Colonel S. M. Lansing, JIG

SUBJECT : SIE-4: Significance of the Communist Psychological Warfare Campaign Alleging Use of Biological Warfare by the US in Korea

1. Subject estimate is urgently required by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Our target is to have a draft before the IAC on Thursday, 20 March. Accordingly, we propose that no meeting be held on terms of reference.

3. Each agency is requested to contribute on an all source basis as indicated in the terms of reference and also on points considered important which have not been covered or which have been assigned to another agency.

4. We are prepared to call a meeting on short notice if any agency wants to discuss aspects of the problem. However, we urge that the preparation of contributions proceed irrespective of whether or not a meeting is called.

5. Contributions are desired in O/NE by the evening of Friday the 14th. Four (4) copies should be sent for the use of O/NE addressed to:

Assistant Director, Current Intelligence

25X1A9a [redacted]

FOR: National Estimates
Room 2028 "Q" Building

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6. Simultaneously, a copy of your contribution should be sent through appropriate channels to the other participating IAC agencies.

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Executive Secretary

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SIE-4

SUGGESTED ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

OIR

Parts I, III, IV, V, VI

G-2

Parts II, III, IV, V, VI

ONI

Parts III, V, VI

AFOIN

Parts III, V, VI

JIG

Parts III, V, VI

OSI

Part I, Section D-2-d
Part I, Section D-3
Part II
Part V, Section E
Part VI, Section B-1

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

12 March 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SIE-4: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CAMPAIGN ALLEGING USE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE BY THE US IN KOREA

THE PROBLEM

To indicate the scale and nature of the Communist psychological warfare campaign alleging use of biological warfare by the US in Korea, and to estimate the significance of this campaign in the light of other indications of Communist intentions.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. WHAT IS THE SCALE AND NATURE OF THE COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CAMPAIGN ALLEGING USE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE?

A. Timing and volume.

B. Relative emphasis by Chinese Communists, North Koreans, and Soviets.

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C. Areas and media of dissemination.

1. North Korea.

2. China.

3. Southeast Asia.

4. South Asia.

5. Japan.

6. USSR.

7. European Satellites.

8. Western Europe.

9. North America.

D. Nature of allegations.

1. Alleged users: what is the degree and possible significance of emphasis on US, Japanese, others?

2. Use of "evidence":

a. What are the alleged sources of this "evidence"?

b. How detailed is it?

c. Does it support each of the charges made?

d. Are there defects in the "evidence"

(1) From a scientific standpoint?

(2) From the propaganda standpoint of convincing well-informed groups -- of convincing broad masses of people?

e. How have the Communists used, or attempted to use, Communist-controlled "investigating" groups?

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3. What diseases have been emphasized? Is there any possible significance in these choices?

4. Are there significant differences in the themes or any other aspect of the campaign as between the Korean area and other areas? (E.g., stress on preventive measures as opposed to concentration on the "Hate America" theme.)

E. How does the present campaign compare:

1. To the May-June 1951 propaganda campaign alleging use of BW in Korea? (Discuss each of the above respects.)

2. To other major propaganda campaigns during the Korean War? (Discuss in general terms.)

3. To Communist propaganda campaigns on similar themes elsewhere in the world, e.g., the potato bug campaign in East Germany? (Discuss in general terms.)

II. WHAT ARE THE FACTS CONCERNING DISEASE IN THE KOREAN AREA?

A. What is the present incidence of the diseases mentioned in the campaign

1. In North Korea?

2. In adjacent areas of China and Manchuria?

B. How does this incidence compare to the 1951 record at this season?

C. In the light of seasonal factors and prevailing health conditions, what is the likelihood of major epidemics in the immediate future of the diseases

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covered by the campaign

1. In North Korea?

2. In adjacent areas of China and Manchuria?

D. What immunization and other countermeasures have been taken in the area by the Chinese Communists and North Koreans:

1. From the start of the Korean conflict to the beginning of the present campaign?

2. Since the start of the present campaign? (Indicate both over-all general measures and specific measures directed at the diseases covered by the campaign.)

E. Is there any division of responsibility for health conditions in the Korean area between the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans? Has there been any evidence of friction between the two in this sphere, either at administrative levels or in popular sentiment?

III. WHAT IS THE CONTEXT OF THE CAMPAIGN?

A. How does the BW theme appear to be related to other propaganda themes being employed by the Communists in the Far East?

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B. Does the conduct of the BW campaign indicate a direct and immediate connection with the progress of the truce negotiations?

C. In general, what are the present indications, from other sources, of immediate Communist intentions:

1. In the Korean conflict?

2. Elsewhere in the Far East?

D. What developments outside the Korean area might be related to the purposes of the BW campaign, and how?

1. Prospective ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty and implementation of related security measures?

2. Developments in the world-wide Communist peace campaign?

3. Other?

IV. WHAT HAS BEEN THE IMPACT OF THE CAMPAIGN?

A. Among Communist troops in Korea?

B. Among the Chinese and North Korean people?

C. Among peoples and government leaders in other parts of the world?

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V. WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE PURPOSES OF THE CAMPAIGN?

(Indicate as to each possible purpose the evidence and arguments affecting its likelihood. It should be noted that some of the possible purposes are not mutually exclusive.)

A. Domestic purposes:

1. Preparation against an expected epidemic.
2. To obscure inefficiency of Communist medical services.
3. To divert attention from possible sources of friction between Chinese Communists and North Koreans.
4. To bolster fighting morale and inspire hatred.
5. Other.

B. External propaganda value:

1. To support the "Hate America" campaign and to create antagonism against the US in the UN and elsewhere.
2. To support the general Communist "peace" campaign.
3. To attract the sympathy of the non-Communist peoples and governments, especially in Asia.
4. To block and impede implementation of the Japanese Peace Treaty and Japanese rearmament.

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5. Other.

C. To confuse and prolong the truce negotiations.

D. Propaganda preparations to justify a breaking off of current truce negotiations by the Communists.

E. Propaganda preparations for a Communist offensive in Korea employing BW weapons.

1. What are Communist capabilities for conducting such an offensive

a. Against personnel?

b. Against crops and livestock?

2. What disadvantages would the Communists see in launching such a campaign, e.g., what might be the danger of it spreading behind Communist lines?

F. Propaganda preparations for a Communist offensive using conventional weapons, specifically:

1. Air offensive in Korea.

2. Air and ground offensive in Korea.

3. Overt Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina or Burma.

4. Attack upon Taiwan.

5. Other

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VI. WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE COMMUNISTS WILL CONTINUE THE CAMPAIGN AND WHAT ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES MIGHT THEY EMPLOY?

A. Likelihood of continuation. Under what conditions might the campaign be slowed down or discontinued?

B. What new techniques might be employed?

1. Is there a likelihood that the Communists might permit the IRC to investigate and then plant fabricated evidence for the IRC to find? Is there any technical obstacle to such planting? Could it be made convincing?

2. How might the Communists make further use of Communist-controlled investigating groups?

3. Other.

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MAR 12 1952

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

12 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ESTIMATES STAFF

Subject: Initiation of SIE-4

1. SIE-4, "Significance of the Communist Propaganda Warfare Campaign Alleging US Use of Biological Warfare in Korea," was scheduled by the DCI on 11 March. Priority: Crash.

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Chief, Estimates Staff

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